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Three paths to more encompassing supplementary pensions  
Introduction 
Countries that rely heavily on private pensions for the provision of retirement income 
have long been associated with creating a dualism, between those with access to private 
occupational insurance and those without (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Korpi and Palme, 
1998). This dualism implies not merely unequal access to private savings accounts, but 
also to employer contributions, and to the generous tax subsidies with which 
governments incentivise private schemes. 
Patterns of access are well documented. Since they began to develop in the late 
nineteenth century, private pensions have rarely covered more than half of the working 
population. Today, the manufacturing sector displays among the best coverage rates and 
low-skilled service sectors the worst. Coverage increases with income, and atypical 
workers are less likely to be enrolled (OECD, 2012: 105, Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012, 
Wiss, 2015).  
Private-heavy pension systems, defined here as those with a ratio of private to 
public expenditure consistently higher than the OECD average, are not all equally 
dualizing however. By departing from employer voluntarism, it is possible to achieve 
encompassing occupational coverage. The Netherlands is an oft-cited example; 
supplementary private pensions based on collective agreements have long been quasi-
mandatory, the result of regulation from the 1950s extending all benefits negotiated at the 
bargaining table to non-union workers (Myles and Pierson, 2001:315).  As a result over 
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ninety per cent of workers are covered, a proportion comparable to the coverage rates of 
contributory state pensions (Scruggs, 2004).  
While for three decades the Netherlands stood alone among private-heavy pension 
systems in its departure from dualizing employer voluntarism, this is no longer the case. 
Since the 1980s there has been a clear trend towards more encompassing private 
pensions. Of the nine mature welfare states where the ratio of private to public pension 
expenditure is higher than the OECD average1, only Ireland, Canada and the US now rely 
on employer voluntarism in private pension contributions. The rest have either introduced 
or extended mandatory employer contributions to private schemes. The trend is 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
** Table 1 ** 
 
This trend towards more encompassing private pensions is surprising, since it 
goes against well-established institutionalist expectations. Dualism between those with 
access to private occupational pensions and those without is expected to persist over time 
in ‘liberal’ welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990), in ‘basic social security’ and 
‘targeted’ pension systems (Korpi and Palme, 1998), and in most of the so-called 
‘latecomer’ countries (Myles and Pierson, 2001: 315-318) that failed to develop 
significant earnings-related pensions in the immediate post-war years.   
Moreover, the trend has taken place at a time when employers have been 
increasingly reluctant providers of retirement income (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012: 170, 
                                                          
1 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, UK, US. See online appendix for details. 
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Bridgen and Meyer, 2005), divides between insiders and outsiders in terms of social 
protection have been growing, and the political representation of outsiders has been weak 
(Rueda, 2007, Emmenegger et al., 2012).  
In this paper, I offer an explanation for the trend towards more encompassing 
private-heavy pension systems based on the preferences of organized labour. In doing so, 
I build on research that identifies unions as key proponents of the regulatory extension of 
private pension coverage (Trampusch, 2009, Meyer and Bridgen, 2012, Naczyk and 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015, Hacker, 2002). While this research has richly theorised interest 
group preferences, it remains unclear how unions succeed in bringing about more 
encompassing private pensions in the face of employer opposition. 
Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), I show that union demands for 
more encompassing private pensions are met in different ways in different institutional 
contexts. In addition to being negotiated in the familiar way through collective 
agreements (where the institutional capacity allows), mandatory employer contributions 
to private schemes are introduced through top-down regulation by right-of-center 
governments in Continental European countries, and by left-of-center governments in 
Anglophone countries.  
In a second step I focus in on the Anglophone ‘path’ to top-down regulation, 
which remains the least well understood. Through an exploratory case study of the UK, I 
show how unions can play a central role in bringing about more encompassing private 
pensions even where their formal influence in the policymaking process is weak, where 
there is little institutional capacity either for the extension of coverage through collective 
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agreements or for the engineering of reform coalitions, and where employer opposition is 
strong. First, I develop theoretical expectations that form the starting point for my 
empirical analysis, and link these expectations to the paper’s research design.  
 
The politics of more encompassing private pensions 
The development of private pensions is closely linked with that of state pensions. Private 
pensions can be crowded-in or out by state provision, and visa-versa (Myles and Pierson, 
2001, Ebbinghaus, 2011b, Esping-Andersen, 1990). This reflects public concern for the 
overall ‘pensions package’, and makes past policy choices crucial to explaining the 
politics of private pensions (Overbye, 1997). In this vein, government attention to 
extending the coverage of private pensions can be seen as an attempt to make private 
pensions functionally equivalent to state pensions, following retrenchment of the latter 
(Mabbett, 2011).  
 Of course, past policy choices do not determine the development of private 
pensions, but rather shape the policy preferences and influence of relevant political 
actors. In the politics of private welfare, as in those of state benefits, political parties are 
key actors (Overbye, 1997, Mabbett, 2011, Myles and Pierson, 2001). Yet electoral 
politics are likely to be less important than interest group politics. This is because the 
politics of private welfare are often less salient and less visible to the public than the 
politics of state-provided benefits (Hacker, 2002: 42). Exceptions (see Hacker, 2002: 
5 
 
145-153, Mabbett, 2011) tend to concern the security of existing private savings rather 
than the extension of private pensions to new social groups.  
This section therefore starts with a discussion of the preferences of the organised 
interests expected to be central to the politics of private pensions, namely unions, 
employers, and third-party providers. For these groups, the regulation of private pension 
coverage is likely to be an issue of strong enough concern to justify the costs of 
information gathering and mobilization (Hacker, 2002: 43). The discussion then moves 
from interest group preferences to politics, bringing in political parties and labour market 
institutions to derive expectations about the development of more encompassing private 
pensions. 
Employers 
For employers, private occupational pensions are associated with monetary costs 
on the one hand, and benefits in terms of human resource management on the other 
(McCarthy, 2006, Sass, 1997: 18-37). While the costs associated with occupational 
pensions vary with the size of the firm and the risk profile of its employees, the benefits 
depend on the skills profile of the firm’s employees, and the ‘control’ that the employer 
has over the scheme (Mares, 2001: 195-203).  
Thus, employers tend to favour private sector voluntarism and resist top-down 
regulatory measures that increase their costs and reduce their control (Meyer and 
Bridgen, 2012: 391).  Opposition to compulsory employer contributions is expected to be 
particularly strong in small firms where the costs are relatively large, and for firms 
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employing predominantly low-skilled labour where the benefits of ‘tying’ the worker to 
the firm are relatively small (Clark, 2003, Sass, 1997). 
The pensions industry 
Representatives of the pension industry are usually considered to be primary 
drivers of the extension of private pensions (Naczyk, 2013, Leimgruber, 2012). Indeed, 
pension insurers have promoted limited state pensions as a platform for the expansion of 
private schemes (Hacker, 2002, Schulze and Moran, 2006), lobbied for favorable tax 
subsidies (Schulze and Moran, 2006), and fought to remove disincentives to save (Meyer 
and Bridgen, 2012).  
Regulation to mandate employer contributions can increase business for pension 
insurers. By guaranteeing a bigger risk pool and reliable contributions, it can also reduce 
the risk of providing for those on below-average incomes (Meyer and Bridgen, 2012: 
392). Yet commercial insurers tend to share employer concerns about the costs of 
regulation and have historically strongly resisted regulatory incursions into their affairs 
(Meyer and Bridgen, 2012, Hacker, 2002, Immergut et al., 2006). While extending 
private pensions is important for pension industry representatives, top down compulsion 
is unlikely to be a preferred policy tool. Pension industry representatives are likely to be 
‘consenters’ (Korpi, 2006) rather than drivers of the regulatory extension of private 
pensions.  
Unions 
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While organized labour has typically been associated with the development of 
earnings-related state pensions (Esping-Andersen, 1990), it is now clear that unions have 
often driven the development and expansion of private pensions. In the early stages of 
pension system development, unions representing high-skilled employees fought hard to 
protect their occupational benefits and resisted the development of more encompassing 
state earnings-related provision (Oude-Nijhuis, 2009, Pemberton, 2012).  
More recently, unions representing sectors with poor access to occupational 
schemes have pursued the regulatory extension of private occupational benefits as a 
‘second best’ option to introducing or strengthening an earnings-related state pension, 
which they consider to be politically infeasible (Hacker, 2002, Meyer and Bridgen, 2012: 
390). They have found allies in unions representing sectors with good access to 
occupational schemes, who pursued the extension of private pensions because they feared 
the decline of their own schemes or because they hoped this would give them control of 
substantial capital resources. Together, unions representing both insiders and outsiders to 
occupational benefits have pushed for more encompassing coverage, through industry-
level collective agreements (Green-Pedersen, 2006, Commonwealth Treasury of 
Australia, 2001, Naczyk and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015), or through top-down regulation 
(Naczyk and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015, Bonoli, 2006).  
In sum, employers have a clear interest in opposing regulation to make private 
pensions more encompassing, although the strength of their opposition may vary 
according to their size or employee skills profile. Although pension industry 
representatives have an interest in the expansion of private pensions, they are likely to 
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have reservations about top-down regulatory intervention. Unions have reason to unite in 
favour of the regulatory extension of private pensions as a second-best alternative to a 
state earnings-related pension, and as such are the most likely drivers of the trend towards 
more encompassing private arrangements.  
From preferences to politics 
While we have a substantial set of expectations about the preferences of the three key 
groups with a stake in the regulatory reform of private pension, the question of how these 
groups affect the regulatory process has received less attention. In fact, the upshot of 
historical accounts of the extension of private pension coverage through collective 
agreements (Anderson, 2006, Green-Pedersen, 2006), as well as of comparative work on 
the subject (Ebbinghaus, 2011b: 381, Myles and Pierson, 2001, Trampusch, 2009, Wiss, 
2015), has been a consensus that more encompassing private pensions are almost as 
inevitable for those countries with the institutional capacity for ‘self-regulation’ – i.e. for 
the collective negotiation of occupational pensions (Ebbinghaus, 2011a: 317) - as they 
are unattainable for those without. That is, encompassing private pensions are expected 
only where there is widespread union membership, or else where collective agreements 
can be extended to non-organised employees and to firms that did not participate in the 
original agreements (Keune, 2017: 7).  
In seeking to understand how demands for more encompassing private pensions 
play out in the absence of any institutional capacity for collective self-regulation, I start 
from the assumption that similar reform pressures may fare differently in different 
institutional contexts (Myles and Pierson, 2001, Hall and Soskice, 2001, Streeck and 
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Thelen, 2005). In particular, the success of unions in the face of employer opposition will 
depend greatly on how existing institutions structure interest group influence in the 
reform process.  
Institutional contexts characterized by corporatist interest representation and 
fragmentation of political parties and the executive - prevalent in much of Continental 
Europe - facilitate consensus (Lijphart, 2012)2. These systems require compromise and 
negotiation between affected interests in government policymaking. In recent years, 
reforms extending social rights to politically weak outsider groups have been introduced 
in such countries, primarily by right-of-center governments, as part of cost-cutting reform 
packages engineered to generate support from cross-class coalitions (Häusermann, 2010). 
By contrast, in institutional contexts characterized by pluralist representation of 
economic interests and the concentration of political parties and executive power, 
negotiation and compromise to achieve consensus among affected interests is more rare 
(Lijphart, 2012). In such contexts - which overwhelmingly characterize the Anglophone 
countries3 - the top-down extension of private pensions should depend heavily on support 
from governing parties. Since left-of centre parties are most closely associated with union 
interests (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Korpi, 2006, Rueda, 2007), I expect that in the absence 
either of institutions associated with consensus democracy or of an institutional capacity 
                                                          
2 Consensus democracies are also characterised by their federal rather than unitary structure. However, since the 
‘federal-unitary’ dimension is not significantly associated with differences in policy outcomes (Lijphart, 2012: 272), I 
focus here on the ‘exectutive-parties’ dimension. 
3 Ireland is an exception among the Anglophone countries in that it has become notably more corporatist since the 
1980s (Lijphart, 2012: 251; Jahn, 2016). 
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for collective self-regulation, union demands are more likely to come to fruition when a 
strong left government is in power.  
Nevertheless, a substantial body of work indicates that the alliance between 
unions and left-of-centre parties cannot be taken for granted in the post-industrial context, 
and that gaining the support of business is increasingly important to left-of-centre parties 
who feel the need to prove their fiscal rectitude to the electorate (Simoni, 2007, Ludlam 
and Taylor, 2003, Piazza, 2001). For this reason, exploratory work is needed in order to 
understand how unions are able to bring about the development of more encompassing 
private pensions in Anglophone countries.  
In sum then, the empirical analysis starts from the idea that the trend towards 
more encompassing private pensions is likely to have been driven by union demands for 
the extension of private pension coverage as an alternative to significant earnings-related 
state provision. Where there is no institutional capacity for collective self-regulation, 
union demands for the regulatory extension of private pensions may be met when right-
of-centre governments seek to pass cost-cutting reforms in ‘consensus’ systems. In the 
absence however of both the institutional capacity for collective self-regulation and 
institutions that facilitate the engineering of reform coalitions, the regulatory extension of 
private pensions is likely to depend on the ability of unions to influence left-of-centre 
governments. 
Research Design 
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Since the development of more encompassing private pensions is expected to be 
met in different ways in different institutional contexts, I model the reforms using 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a set-theoretic approach that can capture 
equifinality, where alternative causal logics produce the same causal outcome (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). I use the QCA procedure to identify three combinations of 
conditions associated with the introduction of more encompassing private pensions. I 
select conditions on the basis of the theoretical expectations developed above, focusing 
on the institutional and political conditions that are relevant to shaping union preferences 
and influence, and draw on case knowledge gained during the iterative QCA research 
process to calibrate the conditions and to interpret the results of the QCA (Ragin, 2000, 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 305-312). I then present a case study of the UK, a 
representative case of the Anglophone ‘path’ that remains the most poorly understood. 
This exploratory case links the institutional conditions identified in the QCA with the 
reform outcome by explicitly tracing the ways that unions were able to shape the reform 
process in a least likely case of their influence.  
 
Three paths to more encompassing private pensions 
The fsQCA covers reforms in nine private-heavy pension systems between 1980 and 
2009. The data is split into three decades 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009, and the 
analysis is run not with nine country cases, but with twenty-seven country-decade cases. 
This offers analytical leverage by introducing variation in causal conditions over time.  
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The outcome of interest is the development of more encompassing private 
pensions, understood as the extension of occupational pension coverage either through 
collective self-regulation or through top-down government regulation.4 Although top-
down regulation to increase occupational pension coverage may take many forms, 
including mandating that employers simply provide access to an occupational pension, or 
that they enrol employees into an occupational pension scheme by default, I count as 
‘encompassing’ only those reforms which also mandate that employers make 
contributions to the occupational pension scheme that their employees are compulsorily 
or by default enrolled in. For each country-decade, I calibrate membership in the fuzzy-
set ‘cases where private pensions have become significantly more encompassing’ 
(encomp) drawing on a range of government reports and secondary sources. The 
calibration is explained in detail for each country-decade in Box 1 of the online appendix.  
The five conditions included in the model reflect the expectations developed in 
the previous section. I include a measure of the absence of a significant earnings-related 
pension (lo_erel) to reflect the expectation that unions are likely to work together to push 
for mandatory employer contributions where there is no significant earnings-related state 
pension. To do this, I construct a four-value fuzzy set based on the statutory replacement 
rate that accrues at average earnings from the earnings-related state pension, using OECD 
data (OECD, 2011).  
                                                          
4 I also conduct a separate fsQCA for the non-reform outcome (see online appendix). The analysis reinforces the results of the main 
QCA.  
 
13 
 
To capture the expectation that union demands may be met through collective 
self-regulation where such institutional capacity exists, I include the condition of high 
union density (hi_ud) using a measure of union density from the Comparative Political 
Data Set (CPDS) (Armingeon et al., 2011).  
To capture the possibility that in the absence of such institutional capacity union 
demands may be met by strong left-of-centre governments, I include a measure of left-
party control of government (hi_left), using data from the CPDS on the percentage of 
total cabinet posts held by left-of-centre parties.  
Finally, to capture the expectation that union demands may be met as part of a 
cost-cutting reform package in a context of corporatist interest representation and 
political fragmentation, I include conditions to capture the presence of institutions 
associated with ‘consensus’ democracy (hi_cons) and the presence of cost cutting 
reforms (cuts). Closely following Lijphart (2012), I proxy the former using a composite 
indicator made up of the Hicks-Kenworthy indicator of corporatism (Kenworthy, 2003), 
and the 'effective number of parties' from the CPDS (Armingeon et al., 2011). The 
composite indicator closely proxies the ‘executive-parties’ dimension of Lijphart’s 
explanatory framework, since the effective number of parties in a political system is 
expected to be causally linked to all aspects of this dimension except for the level of 
corporatism (Lijphart, 2012: 170).  
The measurement and calibration of both outcome and causal conditions are 
presented in detail in the online appendix. Fuzzy-set conditions contain more information 
than crisp-set conditions and are used wherever possible. The resulting analysis is 
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therefore fuzzy-set, conducted using the specialist software fsQCA2.5. Since an analysis 
of necessary conditions found no causally relevant necessary conditions for the 
development of more encompassing private pensions 5 , the discussion focuses on 
sufficient conditions.  
Analysis of sufficient conditions for the development of more encompassing private 
pensions 
The results of the analysis of sufficient conditions are summarised in Table 26. The 
Boolean algebraic solution term at the top of Table 2 reveals three paths to more 
encompassing private pension coverage in private-heavy pension systems. The first path 
uniquely covers reforms that have occurred in the Anglophone countries - the Australian 
Superannuation Guarantee Act of 1992, the KiwiSaver Act of 2007 of New Zealand, and 
the UK Pensions Act of 2008. No cases logically contradict the statement of sufficiency, 
so the consistency score of 0.95 for this path provides strong support for the claim that 
the combination of a low earnings-related state pension, a left government, the absence of 
high union density and the absence of high political fragmentation is sufficient for the 
extension of private pension coverage in private-heavy systems. In light of the theoretical 
discussion in section two, I interpret this as evidence that in the absence of high union 
density, coherent demands for the extension of private pension coverage as the best 
alternative to an earnings-related state pension can be met by a strong left government. I 
                                                          
5 See online appendix, part D. 
6 As is standard practice, the ‘intermediate’ solution forms the centre of discussion. Directional assumptions, ‘parsimonious’ and 
‘conservative’ solutions can be found in the online appendix. 
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substantiate this interpretation in the next section with a narrative of the UK reform 
process.  
** Table 2 ** 
The second path to more encompassing private pensions uniquely covers the reforms that 
occurred in Continental private-heavy pension systems – the three Swiss reforms of 1982, 
1997 and 2003, and the Dutch reform of 1994. Again, no cases logically contradict the 
statement of sufficiency, so the consistency score of 0.80 provides strong empirical 
support for the claim that the combination of a low earnings-related pension, institutions 
facilitating political consensus, cost-cutting reforms, a non-left government and the 
absence of high union density is sufficient for the extension of private pension coverage. 
In light of the theoretical discussion, I interpret this as support for the proposition that in 
the absence of high union density and a strong left government, demands for the 
extension of private pension coverage as the best alternative to an earnings-related state 
pension can be met as part of a cost-cutting reform package in a context of corporatist 
interest representation and political fragmentation.   
The Danish extension of occupational pensions through collective agreements in 
1991 is uniquely covered by a third path, where union density is high. In this case, 
although conditions did not rule out the top-down introduction of mandatory employer 
contributions by the left government, both the government and employers insisted that 
union demands for the extension of coverage must be met voluntarily through collective 
self-regulation, because it was feared that otherwise contributions would not be viewed 
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by wage earners as part of normal wage increases and wage moderation would be 
compromised (Nielsen, 1996: 251).  
The extension of private pension coverage through the Australian Accord of 1985 
is the only case to remain uncovered by the solution formula. In this case too, union 
density was high, and the extension of private pension coverage was therefore 
approached through collective self-regulation. The exclusion of this Australian case from 
the Danish path is due to the absence of political fragmentation, which meant that 
collective self-regulation proceeded via an Accord between Unions and the Labor party 
rather than via decentralized collective bargaining, a fact which does not alter the 
substantive argument of this paper. 
So the fsQCA reveals three paths to more encompassing private pension 
coverage. The classic path to more encompassing coverage - familiar from historical 
accounts of pension politics - of collective self-regulation, is joined by two ‘top-down’ 
paths. The first of these covers the reforms that occurred in continental Europe, where 
there is corporatist interest representation and fragmentation of political parties and the 
executive. Here, as expected, reforms to extend the coverage of private pensions were 
introduced by right-of-center governments, alongside cost-cutting reforms. The second of 
the ‘top-down’ paths covers the reforms that occurred in Anglophone countries, which in 
the absence of either political fragmentation or an institutional capacity for collective 
self-regulation, were passed - as expected - by left-of-center governments.  
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The UK case 
In the previous section, the country-decade UK00 emerges as a ‘typical’ case of the 
Anglophone reform path. The case of the UK is therefore well suited to explore how in 
the absence of political fragmentation or an institutional capacity for collective self-
regulation, union demands for more encompassing private pensions can influence left-of-
centre governments and bring about reform.  
Although the UK is not the most typical case of the reform path (fuzzy-set 
membership scores in the causal conditions are higher in the other countries), it is chosen 
because it constitutes a ‘least likely’ case for the argument that unions drive policy. 
Policy proposals are shaped within the executive through extensive consultation with 
affected interests, but whilst some interests are incorporated into policymaking others are 
marginalised (Schulze and Moran: 56). Since the 1980s, this has been the case for unions, 
and even the electoral victory of New Labour in 1997 did not restore their influence in 
policy making (Ludlam and Taylor, 2003, Simoni, 2007) 7 . Meanwhile the political 
influence of other organised interests has increased. Employers have been empowered by 
an increased emphasis on economic competitiveness, and the pensions industry has been 
strengthened by a series of policies encouraging the growth of private pensions (Schulze 
and Moran: 59). The narrative over the following pages shows how it is that even in this 
least likely context, union preferences were crucial in shaping New Labour’s policy 
agenda, and made possible the development of more encompassing private pensions.  
                                                          
7 Union influence in economic and social policy was lower in the UK than in New Zealand and Australia, where there 
was ‘partial concertation’ at the time of the reforms (ICTWSS, 2015). 
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Old Labour’s battle for a state earnings-related pension 
In the mid-1950s the British Labour Party and a small number of affiliated unions 
developed a commitment to the idea of a state-earnings related pension that was to 
characterise pension politics for the next forty years. The flat-rate Basic State Pension 
(BSP) set up in 1946 did not secure accustomed standards of living in old age, and 
fuelled a rapid expansion of occupational schemes. The Labour Party made repeated 
attempts to bridge the divide between those with access to these schemes and those 
dependent on the BSP (Pemberton, 2010, Labour Party, 1957). These attempts 
culminated in 1974 with the introduction of the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS), which supplemented the BSP with inflation-linked benefits calculated on the 
basis of the best twenty years of earnings. 
Reforms passed by Thatcher’s Conservative government in the 1980s that eroded 
the SERPS by allowing for ‘contracting-out’ into occupational pensions and creating 
further incentives for the growth of private pensions were fiercely resisted by the Labour 
party (Labour Party, 1985: 111). The Labour party stance had strong union backing. 
According to the TUC, private pension schemes were ‘inferior’ to a state solution. They 
‘would undermine the concept of collective insurance’ and dependence on the rate of 
return from investment was insecure (Labour Party, 1985: 108, Schulze and Moran, 2006, 
TUC, 1985, TUC, 1986). 
Although Labour Manifestos for the 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992 elections show a 
gradual shift towards more centrist positions (Simoni, 2007) at the 1992 general election 
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Labour was still firmly committed to reversing the decline of the SERPS (Harrison, 
1992).  
New Labour’s new policy stance 
However, after a fourth consecutive electoral defeat, the Labour party faced an internal 
rift. The party was ‘struggling to find social policies which please its traditional wing and 
are fiscally responsible’ (Blitz and Smith, 1996, Suzman, 1996). 
Pension policy was to prove particularly contentious. 1994 saw a formal ‘re-
launch’ of the union movement. As part of this re-launch, union leaders reassessed their 
insistence that the state should provide replacement of accustomed earnings on 
retirement. They now believed that there was little chance of restoring the SERPS, and 
occupational schemes were the best alternative way to provide for supplementary 
pensions (Taylor, 1997, Schulze and Moran, 2006, Pemberton, 2010). Unions were aware 
this was a radical break from the past, dubbing their new policy stance ‘a revolution in 
welfare provision and modern trade union thinking’ (Halligan and Martinson, 1998, 
Ludlam and Taylor, 2003).  
The new union policy stance was key in securing support for the ideas of party 
modernizers who had begun to emphasise private saving in lieu of the SERPS. In 1996, 
the Labour Party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) - which was still dominated by 
union votes (Ludlam and Taylor, 2003) - drafted a statement on pensions. The statement 
deemed the restoration of the SERPS unaffordable and set out a commitment to 
developing an alternative approach.  
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This did not go down well with traditionalists within the party (Castle and 
Townsend, 1996). At the 1996 Labour party conference they moved against the NEC 
statement on pensions, insisting that the restoration of SERPS was affordable (Labour 
Party, 1996: 143). But the traditionalists were defeated at the vote. The biggest unions – 
from both high and low skilled sectors - were united in turning their backs on the SERPS 
and moved to support the NEC statement on pensions (Labour Party, 1996: 145). 
Speaking on behalf of the modernizers, Harriet Harman, shadow Secretary of 
State for social security, summed up the rationale behind the NEC statement on pensions:  
‘As we found out, and as the country found out to its cost in 1983, 1987 and 
1992, all the promises in the world will be worth nothing if we threaten our own 
chances at the election’ (Labour Party, 1996: 152).  
In this way, the idea of a compulsory state earnings-related pension was 
decisively defeated at the 1996 Labour Party Conference (Taylor-Gooby and Larsen, 
2004). By the time Labour came to power in the next general election, it had completely 
abandoned its commitment to restoring the SERPS and reversed its categorical rejection 
of private schemes. A Green Paper issued in December 1998 stated the party’s intention 
to replace the SERPS with a flat rate benefit built up through earnings-related 
contributions. This would increase benefits for low-income earners while the majority of 
people would be motivated to contract-out into private pension schemes. 
The issue of compulsion 
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The TUC believed that if occupational pensions were to take on the role of the SERPS, 
they would have involve compulsory employer contributions (TUC, 1998). The issue of 
compulsion was also raised by other organisations during the same period, including the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Institute of Directors, and the 
Conservative Party (Timmins, 1997). In calling for compulsory savings however, these 
organisations in one way or another called for the privatisation of existing contributions 
to the state pension. In this way they differed crucially from the type of compulsion 
desired by the TUC, which involved additional contributions (Timmins, 1997, Cohen, 
1996). The TUC proposal was a call to increase employer responsibility in pension 
provision rather than increasing only individual savings. 
Determined to shake off its image as the party of ‘tax and spend’, the Labour 
Party was reluctant to pursue the TUC’s proposals. It was keen not to alienate employers, 
who were vocal defenders of the voluntarist status quo and likened compulsion to 
conscription and punishment (Timmins, 2002). It feared that a compulsory levy imposed 
on top of National Insurance contributions could be presented as an additional tax (Blitz 
and Smith, 1996). Although the party accepted the need for alternative second tier 
pensions, it had taken the ‘firm decision’ not to make such schemes compulsory 
(Suzman, 1996).  
 In 1999, the Labour government passed the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act, 
which compelled employers to offer a workplace pension but not to contribute. As levels 
of private saving remained stagnant and the government prepared to reform occupational 
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pensions with no mention of compulsory employer contributions, TUC pressure for 
compulsory contributions mounted (Timmins, 2002, Guha, 2002). 
It was in this context that the government set up an independent Commission to 
make recommendations on ‘whether there is a case for moving beyond the current 
voluntarist approach’ (Pensions Commission, 2004: ix). The Commission included a 
union voice in the form of TUC President Jeannie Drake. The Commission’s first report 
identified a national problem of under-saving (Pensions Commission, 2004) and this was 
used by the TUC to bolster its campaign (Barber, 2004). Labour too used the report to 
legitimise softening its anti-compulsion stance (Adams and Turner, 2005), announcing 
that employers would be ‘forced to contribute to occupational pension schemes unless 
many more companies start making voluntary payments on employee’s behalf' (Brown, 
2004).  
The government’s announcement received support neither from the opposition 
nor from other interest groups (Timmins, 2005) Although some businesses who already 
provided occupational pensions welcomed compulsion (Timmins, 2005, Naczyk and 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015), on the whole employer representatives remained publicly united in 
insisting that companies ‘should contribute only if they could afford it’ (Brown, 2004). 
The press reported that compulsion was 'fiercely resisted by employers' (Brown, 2004).   
Similarly, although pension industry representatives were concerned about levels 
of private saving, they supported the reduction of tax disincentives, the simplification of 
regulation, raising financial awareness and reform of the state pension – not increased 
compulsion. Despite having briefly announced the ‘last chance for voluntarism’ in 2003 
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(ABI, 2003), the ABI quickly became ‘cool on the idea’ (Timmins, 2005). It joined the 
NAPF - whose opposition to compulsion had been firmer because its membership 
consisted not only of pension insurers but also of employer providers of occupational 
schemes - in promoting alternative solutions (ABI, 2005a: 3, ABI, 2005b). 
But the idea of compulsion was further legitimized when the Pensions 
Commission reported its findings in 2005. It recommended auto-enrolment combined 
with a modest level of compulsory matching employer contributions as ‘an essential part 
of the reform package’ (Pensions Commission, 2005). The Government seized the 
opportunity to publish reform proposals in the form of two White Papers which closely 
followed the recommendations of the Pensions Commission (DWP, 2006a, DWP, 
2006b).  
Most employers remained strongly against compulsion until the end (DWP, 
2006c: 37). But after the Pension Commission’s report, pension industry representatives 
accepted mandatory employer contributions (DWP, 2007: 8). This endorsement was 
enough to allow the opposition to support the ‘consensus’ in favour of mandatory 
employer contributions when the government’s reform proposals were brought before 
parliament in the form of the 2008 Pensions Act (HC Deb, 16 January 2007: c671, c680).  
Union influence in a least likely case 
The regulatory extension of private pension coverage in the UK emerged from the fsQCA 
as typical of reforms that have made private pensions more encompassing in Anglophone 
countries. The preceding narrative shows how a left-of-centre party came to expand the 
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coverage of private pensions through the introduction of mandatory employer 
contributions. Although union influence in policymaking is usually considered limited in 
modern British pension politics, the narrative shows that unions shaped the development 
of more encompassing private pensions at two critical stages.  
First, in 1996 unions played a vital role in side-lining traditionalists within the 
Labour Party still committed to a state solution for earnings-replacement in old age. In 
this way they helped shape the New Labour consensus that earnings replacement should 
be provided through private means. Second, as the one big group firmly in favour of 
mandatory employer contributions, unions singlehandedly put employer compulsion on 
the political agenda, and this made possible the move towards more encompassing 
private pensions in 2008.  
 
Conclusion  
Over the past decades private-heavy systems, long associated with dualism of access to 
adequate earnings replacement in retirement, have experienced a trend towards more 
encompassing coverage. While a diverse literature has richly theorized interest group 
preferences and identified unions as key proponents of more encompassing coverage, 
there has been no attempt to develop a systematic account of the politics behind these 
reforms. It is not clear how union desires for more encompassing coverage have found 
their political expression in countries as different as Denmark, the UK, and Switzerland.  
 In this paper, I derived from the literature a set of expectations regarding how 
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union preferences might find political expression in different institutional contexts. Using 
this to inform a fsQCA, I mapped three paths to the extension of private pension coverage 
in private heavy systems a) a ‘Collective self-regulation’ path; b) a ‘Continental’ path 
characterized by political institutions that facilitate consensus, where the top-down 
regulatory extension of private pension coverage takes place under right-of-centre 
governments; and c) an ‘Anglophone’ path of top-down regulation by strong left 
governments.  
While there have been a number of excellent country-level accounts that can 
substantiate the ‘Collective self-regulation’ and ‘Continental’ paths, the ‘Anglophone’ 
path was in need of some unpacking. The UK, New Zealand, and Australia are some of 
the most unlikely contexts for reforms that move away from employer voluntarism, and 
these countries have also received the least academic attention from scholars of 
comparative pension politics. Despite Naczyk and Seeleib-Kaiser’s compelling account 
of union alliance-building and preference formation in the UK (2015), it remained 
unclear how union calls for more encompassing private pensions could bring about 
change. There was no institutional capacity for either collective self-regulation or the 
development of cross-class alliances, employer opposition was strong, formal union 
influence in the policymaking process was weak, and the political left was keen to 
display fiscal rectitude.  
An exploratory case of the UK, which is a typical case of the ‘Anglophone’ path 
as well as a least likely case for union influence, shows that although ‘hard’ union 
influence in policymaking was low, employer opposition to compulsion succeeded only 
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in keeping mandatory contributions low and delaying their introduction (Thurley, 2011). 
Ultimately, employer calls for continued voluntarism were ignored by a Labour party 
otherwise keen to gain business group support. Unions achieved this in two stages. First, 
they side-lined the idea that earnings-replacement in old age needed to be publicly 
provided, by drawing attention to the strategic importance of proving to the electorate 
that Labour would exercise fiscal restraint, starting in a very public way with their 
flagship pensions policy. Having helped shape the New Labour consensus that earnings 
replacement should be privately financed, unions fought to extend access to occupational 
schemes. As the only notable group firmly in favour of mandatory employer 
contributions, they singlehandedly put employer compulsion on the political agenda.  
As post-industrial societies struggle to contain state spending on what has long 
been the largest category of social transfer, the private provision of retirement income is 
likely to become more prevalent. It is therefore important to understand the political 
dynamics that shape the development of private-heavy pension systems.  This paper goes 
some way towards this end. In so doing, it also contributes to recent work that seeks to 
understand the politics of solidarity and dualization in post-industrial societies 
(Emmenegger et al., 2012). Building on research that shows unions demand more 
encompassing private pensions in the absence of adequate state provision (Naczyk and 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015, Hacker, 2002, Meyer and Bridgen, 2012, Bonoli, 2006), the 
contribution of this paper lies in showing how these demands are able to come to fruition 
in very different institutional contexts. 
It is important to end on a note of caution. Even where private pensions have 
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become significantly more encompassing, some gaps in coverage remain, particularly 
among the increasingly large group of ‘atypical’ workers who risk exclusion on the basis 
of their low earnings or self-employment (OECD, 2012). Moreover, the solidaristic 
effects of more encompassing coverage may be undermined where minimum mandatory 
employer contributions are low, administrative costs high, and state pensions means-
tested. It is a significant limitation of this study not to have analysed the extent to which 
more encompassing coverage has benefited those individuals affected. It would therefore 
be premature to celebrate the end of the dualisms associated with private-heavy pension 
systems. 
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